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Fuel Tax Incidence in Developing Countries: The Case of Costa Rica 
Allen Blackman, Rebecca Osakwe, and Francisco Alpizar 
Abstract 
Although fuel taxes are a practical means of curbing vehicular air pollution, congestion, and 
accidents in developing countries—all of which are typically major problems—they are often opposed on 
distributional grounds. Yet few studies have investigated fuel tax incidence in a developing country 
context. We use household survey data and income-outcome coefficients to analyze fuel tax incidence in 
Costa Rica. We find that the effect of a 10 percent fuel price hike through direct spending on gasoline 
would be progressive, its effect through spending on diesel—both directly and via bus transportation—
would be regressive (mainly because poorer households rely heavily on buses), and its effect through 
spending on goods other than fuel and bus transportation would be relatively small, albeit regressive. 
Finally, we find that although the overall effect of a 10 percent fuel price hike through all types of direct 
and indirect spending would be slightly regressive, the magnitude of this combined effect would be 
modest. We conclude that distributional concerns need not rule out using fuel taxes to address pressing 
public health and safety problems, particularly if gasoline and diesel taxes can be differentiated.   
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Fuel Tax Incidence in Developing Countries: The Case of Costa Rica 
Allen Blackman, Rebecca Osakwe, and Francisco Alpizar ∗ 
1. Introduction 
Over the past four decades, vehicle fleets in developing countries have grown at 6 percent 
per year, double the rate for developed countries (Dargay et al. 2007). As cars, trucks and buses 
have proliferated, so too have attendant negative externalities, including air pollution, traffic 
congestion, and accidents. Today, vehicles are a leading source of local air pollution in 
developing countries, contributing more than 90 percent of emissions in some cases (Timilsina 
and Dulal 2009). In addition, they generate 13 percent of global emissions of greenhouse gases 
(Pachauri and Reisinger 2007). And annual deaths from accidents in developing countries 
average almost 1 per 100 vehicles, a rate three times higher than that for industrialized countries 
(Sterner 2003).       
Unfortunately, a number of factors limit policymakers’ ability to curb these problems 
using conventional command-and-control measures, such as maintenance and inspection 
programs, fuel economy standards, driving restrictions, and technology mandates. Mobile 
sources are exceptionally plentiful while regulatory institutions are typically undermanned and 
underfunded. Just as important, political will for such regulation is often inadequate (Sterner 
2003; Russell and Vaughn 2003).  
An often-discussed means of sidestepping these institutional constraints is to impose a tax 
on vehicular fuel: higher taxes can spur cuts in driving, substitution out of fuel-inefficient 
vehicles, and consequently a reduction in polluting emissions, congestion, and traffic accidents 
(Sterner 2007; Timilsina and Dulal 2008). Although fuel taxes have the potential to generate 
deadweight welfare losses, welfare analyses for both industrialized and developing countries 
have found that given the large negative externalities associated with driving (and the potential 
for offsetting distorting labor taxes with fuel tax revenue) the net effect of fuel taxes on welfare 
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is generally positive and substantial (Parry and Small 2005; West and Williams 2007; Parry and 
Timilsina 2008).   
Notwithstanding that evidence, a common argument against raising fuel taxes is that it 
would be regressive—poor households would bear an unfair burden. Studies of fuel tax 
incidence in industrialized countries, where vehicle ownership is widespread in all 
socioeconomic classes, have generated mixed results (Parry et al. 2007; Poterba 1991; Santos 
and Catchesides 2005; West and Williams 2004). Intuitively, one might expect fuel taxes to be 
less regressive in developing countries where vehicle ownership is concentrated in higher 
socioeconomic brackets (Sterner 2007). Some emerging research provides support for this 
hypothesis (Datta 2008; Ziramba et al. 2009). To our knowledge, this question has yet to be 
addressed in the case of Central or South America.  
To help fill this gap, we use data from a 2005 household income and expenditure survey 
and a 2002 input-output matrix to analyze the incidence of fuel taxes in Costa Rica. Costa Rica is 
a particularly interesting case study because it is classified as an “upper middle income country” 
(World Bank 2009)—if fuel taxes are not regressive in Costa Rica, they are unlikely to be 
regressive in poorer countries where vehicle ownership is even more concentrated in higher 
socioeconomic brackets.  
We find that effect of a  10 percent price hike through direct spending on gasoline would 
be progressive, its effect through spending on diesel—both directly and via bus transportation—
would be regressive (mainly because poorer households rely heavily on buses), and its effect 
through spending on goods other than fuel and bus transportation would be relatively small, 
albeit regressive. Finally, we find that although the overall effect of a 10 percent fuel price hike 
through all types of direct and indirect spending would be slightly regressive, the magnitude of 
this combined effect would be modest. We conclude that distributional concerns need not rule 
out using fuel taxes to address pressing public health and safety problems, particularly if gasoline 
and diesel taxes can be differentiated.    
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The second section presents background 
information on Costa Rica—specifically, its vehicle fleet, vehicular air pollution, congestion, and 
traffic accident problems and its public discourse about distributional effects of fuel taxes. The 
third section presents our incidence analysis, with discussions of our methods, data, and results. 
The last section presents a summary and conclusion.  Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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2. Background 
2.1. Vehicle Fleet 
Between 1999 and 2007, Costa Rica’s vehicle fleet grew at 3 percent per year, spurred by 
robust economic and population growth (Table 1). By 2007, roughly 800,000 cars, trucks and 
buses were registered in Costa Rica, one for every six citizens (Table 1). Seventy percent of 
these vehicles were in the greater metropolitan area (GMA) of San José, which is home to 60 
percent of the country’s population (Herrera and Rodríguez 2008).  Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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  (millions)  (’91 col.)  (no.)  (’91 col./liter) (’91  col./liter)  (barrels) (barrels)  (no.) 
1999 3.838 1,398  612,300  29  42  179,722  415,052  48,983 
2000 3.810 1,423  641,302  39  56  229,768  394,918  50,358 
2001 3.907 1,439  664,563  37  53  251,806  423,255  53,208 
2002 3.998 1,480  689,763  34  49  259,584  430,905  58,380 
2003 4.089 1,575  728,421  39  55  257,762  443,723  53,668 
2004 4.179 1,642  705,975  43  60  265,521  460,323  52,362 
2005 4.266 1,739  705,546  53  72  282,415  503,681  57,127 
2006 4.354 1,892  729,487  57  82  299,301  587,228  68,627 
2007 4.443 2,039  797,902  64  84  311,997  650,535  69,761 
             
Avg. annual  
percentage 
change  1.85 4.86 2.94 14.25  9.58  7.43 5.95  4.82 
Sources: 
aInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database; 
bMinisterio de Obras Públicas (MOPT), Dirección de Planificación 
Sectorial; 
cRefinadora Costarricense de Petróleo (RECOPE); 
dRefinadora Costarricense de Petróleo (RECOPE); 
eMinisterio de Obras Públicas (MOPT), 
Dirección de Planificación Sectorial, using data from Consejo de Seguridad Vial.Resources for the Future 
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2.2. Negative Externalities 
Costa Rica’s vehicle fleet contributes to severe air pollution, congestion, and traffic 
accidents. It generates approximately three-quarters of polluting emissions in the GMA (Herrera 
and Rodríguez 2005), where average annual levels of total suspended particulates, nitrogen 
oxides, and especially sulfur dioxide, all exceed national or international norms (Table 2).1 A 
contingent valuation survey conducted in the mid-1990s found that GMA residents viewed 
mobile source air pollution as their single most important environmental problem (Celis et al. 
1996 cited in Johnstone et al. 2001).  
Table 2. Mean annual concentrations of air pollutants in San José, Costa Rica, and World 
Health Organization and European Union guidelines  
















San José, CR  1,186  101  18  160  31  2000 
        
WHO
e  guideline    60   50 40  
EU
f  limit    --  40 20 30  
aTotal suspended particulate matter; 
bparticulate matter smaller than 10 microns; 
csulfur dioxide; 
dnitrogen dioxide; 
eWorld Health Organization; 
fEuropean Union. 
Source: Baldasano et al. 2003. 
Cars, trucks, and buses also contribute to untenable congestion on the GMA’s poorly 
planned and maintained road network, particularly in the morning and evening rush hours, when 
traffic is often completely gridlocked. Travel speeds in the GMA average less than five miles per 
hour, and a survey of car commuters found they would be willing to pay half of the national 
average hourly wage for travel time reductions (Vega et al. 2004; Alpízar and Carlsson 2003).  
Finally, traffic accidents are a major problem throughout Costa Rica. Despite safety 
campaigns, the number of accidents has grown by 5 percent per year in recent years (Table 1). In 
2007, a fifth of disability pensions administered by the Costa Rican Social Security agency were 
for victims of traffic accidents (Ávalos 2007).     
                                                 
1 Carbon monoxide levels also regularly exceed national limits (Alfaro and Ferrer 2001). Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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2.3. Fuel Taxes 
The 2001 Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency (No. 8114) replaced a complicated 
system of fuel taxes and fees administered by several regulatory agencies with a single tax 
administered by the Ministry of Finance. The tax is a fixed sum per liter for each type of fuel 
(regular gasoline, premium gasoline, and diesel) adjusted four times a year for inflation. In May 
2009, the tax was 181 colones per liter for regular gasoline, 189 colones per liter for premium 
gasoline, and 107 colones per liter for diesel (La Gaceta 2009). Because the fuel tax is a fixed 
sum, its percentage contribution to the total retail price of fuel depends on that pretax price of 
fuel. In recent years, this contribution has ranged from 28 percent to 52 percent for regular 
gasoline and has been within the range of the percentage contribution of fuel taxes in other Latin 
American countries (Figures 1 and 2). The 2001 law that established Costa Rica’s fuel tax 
mandated that revenues be allocated as follows: 66.4 percent to the Ministry of Finance 
(Ministerio de Hacienda), 29.0 percent to the National Road Council (Consejo Nacional de 
Vialidad, CONAVI), 3.5 percent to National Forestry Finance Fund (Fondo Nacional de 
Financiamiento Forestal, FONAFIFO), 1.0 percent to the University of Costa Rica (Universidad 
de Costa Rica, UCR), and 0.1 percent to the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Ganadería, MAG).   
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Figure 2. Tax as share of retail price of regular gasoline for Costa Rica, Chile,  
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Sources: CEPAL and Costa Rica Finance Ministry. 
2.4. Distributional concerns 
The notion that rising fuel prices unfairly burden the poor is a staple of Costa Rican 
political discourse and has been used to argue for reductions in fuel taxes. Concern has often 
focused on diesel, which is used to fuel thermoelectric generating plants, trucks, and buses.2 In 
the past several years, faced with rising diesel prices, the Costa Rican Electricity Institute 
(Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, ICE), along with associations of bus drivers and truck 
drivers, has lobbied for a reduction in the tax on diesel on the grounds that it would make 
electricity, bus transport, and food shipped by truck more affordable to low-income households. 
For example, in 2008 national legislation was introduced to exempt electric power plants from 
                                                 
2 In addition, diesel is increasingly used in private vehicles because the relatively high price of gasoline has created 
incentives for households to switch to diesel cars (Herrera and Rodriguez 2005).  Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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paying the diesel tax (January 2008, file 16759), exempt buses and taxies from the tax (October 
2008, file 17132), and reduce all fuel taxes by 30 percent and disallow increases for a year 
(January 2008, file 16924). In addition, in July 2008, bus drivers threatened a national strike on 
the grounds that fuel prices had become untenably high (Cantero 2008).  
3. Incidence Analysis 
This section presents an analysis of the incidence of fuel taxes in Costa Rica. The first 
subsection discusses methods and presents our analytical framework. The second subsection 
discusses our data. The next subsection focuses on first-order impacts—that is, those that are 
most significant—and the last section focuses on second-order impacts.  
3.1. Methods 
The incidence of fuel taxes is typically assessed by characterizing the variation across 
economic strata of some measure of the change in households’ welfare attributable to the tax 
(e.g., the dollar amount of fuel taxes they paid or the change in their consumer surplus) 
normalized by a measure of their pretax welfare (for example, total income or expenditure). The 
literature on fuel tax incidence highlights three methodological issues. The first concerns the 
measure of the pretax welfare used both to sort households into economic strata and to normalize 
changes in welfare. Studies that use annual income to proxy for pretax welfare generally find that 
gasoline taxes are regressive (KPMG Peat Marwick 1990). However, these studies have been 
criticized on the grounds that “permanent income” (Friedman 1957), not annual income, drives 
households’ consumption choices and that socioeconomic strata defined by annual income 
include households whose income is much higher or lower than their permanent income (because 
they are headed by people who are particularly young and old or in the midst of a transient 
financial shock) and whose consumption choices, therefore, differ markedly from other members 
of these strata. Most recent analyses of fuel tax incidence use measures of permanent income, 
such as annual household expenditure, to proxy for pretax welfare (Poterba 1991; Walls and 
Hanson 1999; Metcalf 1999; Hassett et al. 2009). These studies tend to find that fuel taxes are 
less regressive than studies that rely on annual income to measure welfare. Here, we use annual 
expenditure as a proxy for lifetime income. 
The second methodological issue concerns indirect impacts of fuel taxes on households’ 
welfare. An ideal analysis of fuel tax incidence would measure general equilibrium changes in 
consumer and producer prices of all goods and services in the economy due to a fuel tax 
increase, and then measure the effects of those price changes on household welfare in different Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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economic strata. However, the informational requirements of such an analysis, which include 
demand and supply elasticities for all goods and services and the distribution of ownership of 
firms across economic strata, are extensive (West and Williams 2004). Many studies of fuel tax 
incidence omit altogether consideration of indirect impacts of fuel taxes (Poterba 1991; Walls 
and Hanson 1999; Bureau 2009). Those that do not often make simplifying assumptions to 
facilitate modeling these effects—specifically, that supply is perfectly elastic, so impacts of fuel 
taxes on producer prices can be ignored, and in many cases, that demand for various goods and 
services is perfectly inelastic (Metcalf 1999; Hassett et al. 2009; Datta 2009). Despite the 
assumption that consumers do not respond to price changes, these studies often find that indirect 
impacts of fuel taxes are relatively small (Metcalf 1999). Here, following Hassett et al. (2009) 
and others, we use coefficients from an input-output matrix to simulate the indirect impact of 
fuel taxes and we assume that supply is perfectly elastic and demand is perfectly inelastic so that 
economic agents do not adjust their purchases of goods and services because of the tax (i.e., they 
do not substitute out of newly expensive goods and services).3 Given this assumption, our 
analysis generates an upper bound on the effect of a fuel tax on household expenditures. 
A final methodological issue is the recycling of fuel tax revenue: the incidence of fuel 
taxes depends on whether and how tax revenue is used (Metcalf 1999; Wiese et al. 1995). Here, 
we abstract from this issue and focus on tax impacts absent recycling.  
We use the following simple analytical framework to assess the incidence of a fuel price 
hike due to a tax increase. Average household expenditure on fuel type j in expenditure decile s, 
Efjs, is defined as the price of that fuel type, Pfj, times the average quantity consumed, Qfjs  
 
fjs fj fjs Q P E = . (1) 
 
We consider four types of fuel expenditures: direct expenditure on gasoline (g), direct 
expenditure on diesel (d), indirect expenditure on diesel via spending on bus transportation (b), 
and indirect expenditure on fuel (both gasoline and diesel) via spending on six other categories 
of goods and services, which are indexed by i. Hence, average total expenditure on all categories 
of fuel in decile s, ETs, is   
                                                 
3 This assumption is less unrealistic than it normally would be, given that it applies to broad categories of goods 
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Given our assumption that consumers do not respond to price changes—that is, that quantity in 
equation (1) is fixed—it is easy to show that the change in expenditure on fuel type j in decile s, 
ΔEfjs, due to a change in the price of fuel type j, ΔPfj, is simply the percentage change in price 
times the original expenditure: 
 
fjs fj fj fjs E ) P P ( E Δ = Δ . (3) 
 
We assume a uniform increase in the price of fuel across all of our four categories of fuel, so (3) 
may be written 
 
fjs f f fjs E ) P P ( E Δ = Δ . (4) 
 











fis fbs fds fgs f f Ts E E E E ) P P ( E  .    (5) 
 
Direct expenditures on gasoline and diesel, Efgs and Efds, are derived from survey data (discussed 
below). Indirect expenditure on diesel via spending on bus diesel in decile s, Efbs, is the 
expenditure on bus travel, also derived from survey data, times the percentage of this spending 
devoted to fuel, αfb, derived from the public bus regulatory authority’s pricing model, that is 
 
fb bs fbs E E α = . (6) 
 
Finally, indirect expenditure on fuel (both gasoline and diesel) in decile s via spending on the 
other six categories of goods and services is the expenditure in each category, derived from 
survey data, times the percentage of this spending devoted to fuel, γfi, derived from a social Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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accounting matrix (discussed below), that is 
 
fi is fis E E γ = . (7) 
 
To assess the incidence of spending on each of our four categories of fuel, we multiply (5) 
through by the percentage change in the price of fuel, divide each category by total expenditure, 




γ Δ + α Δ +
Δ + Δ = Δ
6
1 i
Ts fi is f f Ts fb bs f f
Ts fds f f Ts fgs f f Ts Ts
) E E )( P P ( ) E E )( P P (
) E E )( P P ( ) E E )( P P ( E E
 (8) 
Intuitively, each term on the right-hand side is the increase in the share of total spending 
devoted to fuel type j in decile s. We compare these increases across deciles to assess the 
incidence of the fuel price hike. For any given category of fuel, the effect of the price hike is 
regressive if the relevant increases are higher in “poorer” deciles than they are in “richer” ones, 
and it is progressive if the opposite is true. For example, if the increase in the share of total 
spending devoted to gasoline is higher in poorer deciles than in richer ones, the effect of the price 
hike through spending on gasoline is regressive. For each category of fuel expenditure, we also 
calculate the Suits index, a widely used measure of tax incidence—the tax analog of the Gini 
coefficient used to measure income inequality (Suits 1977). The Suits index is bounded by –1 
and 1. For a proportional tax, it is equal to zero, for a progressive tax it is positive, and for a 
regressive tax it is negative.  
    3.2. Data 
Our data on average household expenditures in each decile (on all goods and services, 
ETs, gasoline Efgs, diesel, Efds, bus transportation, Ebs, and other goods and services, Eis) are 
derived from the National Statistics and Census Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Censos, INEC) 2004–2005 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, a random survey of 
4,231 Costa Rican households. We use monthly expenditure to calculate the upper and lower 
bounds of expenditure deciles in the INEC data. Table 3 presents the results: the upper bounds of 
the deciles range from $178 to $52,796.  Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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Table 3. Costa Rica 2004–2005 monthly expenditure decile  








  (2004 US $) (2004 US $) (%) 
1 0  178  6 
2 178  268  10 
3 268  353  15 
4 353  455  21 
5 455  571  30 
6 572  730  33 
7 731  953  44 
8 953  1,297  60 
9 1,301  2,117  69 
10 2,131  52,796  91 
Source: INEC. 
Our data on the percentage of spending on bus transportation devoted to fuel, αfb, is 
drawn from the cost-based pricing model of the Public Service Regulatory Authority (Autoridad 
Reguladora de Servicios Públicos, ARESEP), the institution that sets bus fares in Costa Rica 
(ARESEP 2008). This model mandates that the cost of diesel accounts for 21 percent of busfares. 
Accordingly, we assume that 21 percent of households’ expenditures on bus transportation is 
devoted to diesel.  
Our data on the percentage of spending on six other categories of goods and services 
devoted to fuel, γfi, is drawn from a 2002 input-output matrix for Costa Rica extracted from 
Sánchez (2006). Input-output matrices catalogue estimates of the intersectoral economic 
dependencies (Leontief 1986; ten Raa 2005). More specifically, each column of an input-output 
matrix corresponds to an output, and each row corresponds to an input used to produce it. Each 
cell indicates the average dollar value of the corresponding input needed to produce one dollar of 
the corresponding output. Sánchez’s (2006) social accounting matrix, which embeds an input-
output matrix, contains dozens of inputs and outputs. To make it compatible with our INEC 
survey data, we aggregated these inputs and outputs to nine broad categories represented in these 
data (using expenditures on each input or output to calculate a weighted average for each 
category). Table 4 presents the results for fuel. These coefficients can be interpreted as the 
percentage of spending on each category of goods and services devoted to fuel.  Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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Table 4. Costa Rica input-output coefficients for fuel: Dollar value of fuel used in 










aA catch-all “other” category with a  
coefficient of $0.0256 is omitted for 
clarity. 
Source: Sánchez 2006 and authors’ calculations. 
Finally, we assume a 10 percent across-the-board increase in the price of fuel. To our 
knowledge, the amount by which the price of fuel would need to be increased to maximize social 
welfare in Costa Rica, taking into account negative externalities associated with local and global 
air pollution, traffic congestion, and traffic accidents, has yet to be estimated. However, it is 
probably safe to assume that a 10 percent price hike would still fall short of welfare-maximizing 
level: Parry and Timilsina (2008) found that fuel prices in Mexico City would need to be raised 
by 1600 percent to maximize welfare.  
 3.3. First-Order Effects 
Table 5 and Figure 3 present the results of our incidence analysis for the first three 
categories of fuel expenditures—direct spending on gasoline, direct spending on diesel, and 
indirect spending on diesel via bus transportation. We refer to these as first-order effects because 
they are considerably larger than effects for the last category, the indirect spending on fuel via 
other goods and services.  
Table 5 and Figure 3 indicate that the effect of a 10 percent fuel price hike through direct 
spending on gasoline is progressive: the increase in the share of total spending devoted to 
gasoline is higher in richer deciles than in poorer ones, and the Suits index for this increase is 
positive (0.091). The largest impact is in the ninth decile, where a 10 percent increase in gasoline 
prices spurs slightly less than a one-third of 1 percent increase in total spending ($5.61 per 
month).  Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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Table 5. First- and second-order effects of 10% fuel price hike in Costa Rica: 
Resultant change in percentage of total household expenditure on nine commodities, by decile 
Decile First-order  effects  Second-order effects  All 
effects 




diesel All  Food  Housing  Clothing  Health Education  Recreation  All  All 
1  0.0000 0.0770  0.3670  0.4440  0.4440 0.0186 0.1256  0.0013 0.0004  0.0000  0.0066  0.1525 0.5965 
2  0.0350 0.0860  0.4110  0.4970  0.5320 0.0181 0.1213  0.0019 0.0005  0.0000  0.0106  0.1525 0.6845 
3  0.0860 0.1030  0.4890  0.5920  0.6780 0.0182 0.1117  0.0018 0.0007  0.0001  0.0102  0.1426 0.8206 
4  0.0930 0.1090  0.5190  0.6280  0.7210 0.0174 0.1067  0.0018 0.0005  0.0001  0.0117  0.1382 0.8592 
5  0.1500 0.0950  0.4500  0.5450  0.6950 0.0163 0.0929  0.0021 0.0006  0.0001  0.0115  0.1235 0.8185 
6  0.1650 0.0910  0.4350  0.5260  0.6910 0.0158 0.0878  0.0021 0.0007  0.0001  0.0126  0.1189 0.8099 
7  0.2360 0.0870  0.4140  0.5010  0.7370 0.0144 0.0818  0.0021 0.0008  0.0001  0.0126  0.1118 0.8488 
8  0.3000 0.0690  0.3280  0.3970  0.6970 0.0123 0.0655  0.0017 0.0009  0.0002  0.0126  0.0931 0.7901 
9  0.3130 0.0530  0.2530  0.3060  0.6190 0.0093 0.0623  0.0016 0.0011  0.0002  0.0117  0.0862 0.7052 
10  0.2940 0.0320  0.1520  0.1840  0.4780 0.0049 0.0493  0.0010 0.0010  0.0002  0.0089  0.0653 0.5433 
                      
Suits 
index  0.091 0.103  -0.272  -0.188  -0.010  -0.277  -0.163 -0.150 0.084  0.179  -0.063  -0.160 -0.011 
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Figure 3. First-order effects: Increase in share of total household spending  


















































Gasoline Diesel Bus Diesel All Diesel All
 
The same qualitative result holds for direct spending on diesel, although the distribution 
of the increased spending across deciles is less skewed toward the highest expenditure deciles. 
The largest impact is in the fourth decile, where a 10 percent increase in diesel prices spurs a 
slightly more than one-tenth of 1 percent increase in total spending ($0.48 per month). The Suits 
index for the average increase in the share of total spending devoted directly to diesel is positive 
(0.103). Presumably, our results for direct spending on gasoline and diesel are at least partly, if 
not mainly, due to the concentration of vehicle ownership in Costa Rica in richer deciles (Table 
3). 
Our qualitative results for the last first-order effect—indirect spending on diesel via bus 
transportation—are opposite those for direct spending on gasoline and diesel: the effect of a fuel 
price hike through bus diesel would be regressive. The increase in the share of total spending 
devoted to bus diesel is higher in poorer deciles than in richer ones, and the Suits index for this 
increase is negative (–0.272). Moreover, in most deciles, the magnitude of this effect is larger 
than for direct spending on either gasoline or diesel. The largest impact is in the fourth decile, Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
16 
where a 10 percent increase in diesel prices spurs more than a half of 1 percent increase in total 
spending ($2.27 per month). Presumably, this result reflects poorer Costa Rican households’ 
heavy reliance on the country’s extensive, quasi-public system of bus transportation.  
Hence, the distributional impact of a diesel tax is different for direct spending on this fuel 
and indirect spending via bus transportation. Given that the latter swamps the former, it is not 
surprising that when these two categories of spending are aggregated, the effect of a fuel price 
hike through both types of diesel is regressive. The increase in the share of total spending 
devoted to diesel due to a price hike is higher in poorer deciles than in richer ones, and the Suits 
index is negative (–0.188). 
Finally, the sixth column in Table 3 aggregates all three first-order effects: increased 
direct spending on gasoline, increased direct spending on diesel, and increased indirect spending 
on diesel via bus transportation. Here too, the bus diesel effect dominates. As a result, the 
increase in the share of total spending due to all three first-order effects is slightly higher in the 
poorer deciles than in the richer ones, and the Suits index is negative (–0.010). The largest effect 
is in the seventh decile, where a 10 percent increase in fuel prices spurs slightly less than a three-
quarters of 1 percent increase in total spending ($6.73 per month).  
3.3. Second-Order Effects 
Table 5 and Figure 4 present the results of our incidence analysis for the indirect 
spending on fuel via six categories of nontransportation goods and services, which we refer to as 
second-order effects. Our calculations suggest that the effect of a price hike through four of the 
six second-order effects—food, housing, clothing, and recreation—would be regressive. Only in 
the case of health and education would they be progressive. Of the six effects, the largest are for 
spending on housing and food. The remaining four effects are an order of magnitude smaller than 
the first-order effects discussed above. Given that the two largest second-order effects are 
regressive, it is not surprising that when all six second-order effects are aggregated, they are also 
regressive, with a Suits index equal to –0.160.  
By definition, the second-order effects are much smaller than the first-order effects. The 
largest second-order effect is in the first decile, where a 10 percent increase in fuel prices spurs 
slightly less than a one-sixth of 1 percent increase in total spending ($0.19 per month). On 
average, for all deciles, first-order effects are six times larger than second-order effects.       Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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Figure 4. Second-order effects: Increase in share of total household spending  
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3.4. Total Effects 
Table 5 and Figure 5 present the results of our incidence analysis for combined first- and 
second-order effects. They suggest that the overall effect of a fuel price hike in Costa Rica would 
be only slightly regressive: the middle deciles devote the greatest proportion of their spending to 
fuel. The Suits index for this increase is negative (–0.011). On average, for all deciles, fully half 
of this total effect is due to spending on bus diesel.  
The total effect of a 10 percent fuel price hike is modest, even in the socioeconomic strata 
that would be most affected. The largest total effect is in the fourth decile, where a 10 percent 
fuel price increase spurs a 0.86 percent increase in total spending ($1.07 per month). On average, 
for all deciles, a 10 percent tax hike raises spending by three-quarters of 1 percent.  Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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Figure 5. Combined first- and second-order effects: Increase in share of total household 
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4. Conclusion 
We have used 2005 household survey data together with 2002 input-output coefficients to 
analyze the distributional impacts of a 10 percent fuel price hike in Costa Rica. We found that 
the first-order impacts are different for gasoline and diesel. The effect of the price hike through 
direct spending on gasoline would be progressive: households in the highest socioeconomic 
strata would be most affected. By contrast, the effect of the price hike through spending on 
diesel—both direct spending and spending via bus transportation—would be regressive: 
households in lower and middle socioeconomic strata would be most affected because they rely 
heavily on bus transportation. We found that the second-order distributional impacts of a 10 
percent fuel price hike through spending on goods other than fuel and bus transportation would 
be relatively small: on average, one- sixth the size of first-order effects. Finally, we found that 
combined effect of a 10 percent fuel price hike through all types of direct and indirect spending 
on all types of goods and services would be slightly regressive: the middle deciles devote the Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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greatest proportion of their spending to fuel through all types of spending. However, the 
magnitude of this combined effect would be modest: the largest impact is in the fourth decile, 
where a 10 percent fuel price hike spurs less than a 1 percent increase in spending.  
What are the policy implications of these results? In general, they suggest that in Costa 
Rica—and possibly in similarly upper-income developing countries—increases in gasoline taxes, 
whether imposed to help mitigate vehicles’ negative externalities or for other reasons, would not 
exacerbate income inequality, since wealthier strata would bear most of the burden of the 
increase. However, the same is not true of increases in diesel taxes, which have the greatest 
effect on lower- and middle-income strata, mostly because they would increase the cost of bus 
travel.  
One possible specific policy implication is that in Costa Rica and similar countries, 
policymakers can avoid adverse distributional consequences of fuel tax hikes by differentiating 
taxes on diesel and gasoline and reserving steep increases for the latter. This reasoning has not 
been lost on Costa Rican policymakers. The 2001 Law of Tax Simplification and Efficiency set 
taxes on gasoline 70 percent higher than taxes on diesel.  
But while differentiating tax increases by type of fuel could mitigate distributional 
concerns, this policy may be problematic on other grounds. First, if consumers buy far more 
diesel than gasoline as in Costa Rica (Table 1), increasing gasoline taxes will generate less 
revenue than increasing diesel taxes. Second, if diesel vehicles are more plentiful than gasoline 
vehicles, increasing taxes on gasoline would probably do a worse job of mitigating vehicles’ 
negative externalities because, compared with gasoline vehicles, diesel vehicles typically 
generate more of the fine particles that are especially damaging to human health (Sterner 2003). 
Finally, taxing gasoline at a higher rate than diesel can create incentives for businesses and 
households to buy diesel vehicles. In Europe, for example, the share of such cars in the 
automobile fleet is growing quickly and is strongly correlated with increases in the price of 
gasoline relative to diesel (Sterner 2007).  
An alternative policy prescription, also supported by our findings, is to use revenue from 
fuel tax hikes to subsidize bus travel. In Costa Rica, and presumably countries like it, diesel taxes 
are regressive in large part because they raise spending on bus travel.        
In the final analysis, in deciding whether to raise fuel taxes, policymakers in developing 
countries need to balance an array of distributional, political, fiscal, and environmental goals. 
Our analysis demonstrates that distributional concerns need not trump competing goals. 
 Resources for the Future  Blackman, Osakwe, and Alpizar 
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